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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-
103(2)(j) since this appeal was transferred from the Utah Supreme Court to the Utah 
Court of Appeals on July 31,2009. (Add. at 1-4). 
3 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUES, ORDINANCES AND RULES 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are detenninative of the 
appeal: 
1. UTAH CONST., art. VIII, § 1. Judicial powers - Courts. 
The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a supreme court, in a trial 
court of general jurisdiction known as the district court, and in such other 
courts as the legislature by statute may establish. The Supreme Court, the 
district court, and such other courts designated by statute shall be courts of 
record. Courts not of record shall also be established by statute. 
2. UTAH CONST., art. VIII, §11. Judges of courts not of record. 
Judges of courts not of record shall be selected in a manner, for a term, and 
with qualifications provided by statute. However, no qualification may be 
imposed which requires judges of courts not of record to be admitted to 
practice law. The number of judges of courts not of record shall be 
provided by statute. 
3. UTAH CODE ANN. §20A-12-201. Judicial appointees - Retention elections. 
(1) (a) Each judicial appointee to a court is subject to an unopposed 
retention election at the first general election held more than three 
years after the judge or justice was appointed. 
(b) After the first retention election: 
(i) each Supreme Court justice shall be on the regular general 
election ballot for an unopposed retention election every tenth 
year; and 
(ii) each judge of other courts shall be on the regular general 
election ballot for an unopposed retention election every sixth 
year. 
(2) (a) Each justice or judge of a court of record who wishes to retain 
office shall, in the year the justice or judge is subject to a retention 
election: 
(i) file a declaration of candidacy as if a candidate for multi-
county office in accordance with Section 20A-9-202; and 
(ii) pay a filing fee of $50. 
(b) Each justice court judge who wishes to retain office shall, in the 
year the justice court judge is subject to a retention election: 
(i) file a declaration of candidacy as if a candidate for county 
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{i:) T'-;r ': tiling fee of S"*^ . 
UTAH CODE ANN. §78A-1-101. Courts of justice enumerated-Courts of 
record enumerated, 
(1) The following are the courts of justice of this state: 
(a) the Supreme Court; 
(b) the Court of Appeals; 
(c) the district courts; 
(d) the juvenile courts; and 
(e) the justice courts. 
(2) All courts are courts of record, exceptthejusti.ee courts, winch are 
courts not of record. 
UTAH CODE ANN. §78 A 1 104 I i i s t i . ee c< »i i i I ji i.dg«= : a u t h c >rii } >. 
Justice court judges: 
(1) have the same authority regarding matters within their jurisdiction as 
judges of courts of record; 
(2) may issue search warrants and warrants of arrest upon a finding of 
probable cause; and 
(3) may conduct proceedings to determine: 
(a) probable cause for any case within uicn juii>uLciioii.
 t4:iu 
(b) an n/v.nsrYi n-r^m's release on bail Mr b 1 - ^x Ti ,v>cogni \wu\ 
UTAH C'ODH AMV £~8A-2-J01 , PH\A ct^ - »f fvcry court. 
Every court has authority to. 
(1) preserve and enforce order in its immediate presence; 
(2) enforce order in the proceedings before it, or before a person authorized 
to conduct a judicial investigation under its authority; 
(3) provide for the orderly conduct of proceedings before it or its officers; 
(4) compel obedience to its judgments, orders,, and process, and. to the 
orders of a judge out of court, in. a pending action, or proceeding; 
(5) control, in furtherance ofjusti.ee the conduct of its "ministerial officers, 
and. of all other persons in any manner connected with a judicial proceeding 
before it in every matter; 
(6) compel the attendance of persons to testify in a pending action or 
rr-- needing, as provided by. law; 
Ki j administer oaths in a pending action ui pio-wceuiiig. and in all. other 
cases where necessary in the exercise of its authority and duties; 
(8) amend and control its process and orders to conu>rm u>\y>w ^ .- i• • o -
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(9) devise and make new process and forms of proceedings, consistent with 
law, necessary to carry into effect its authority and jurisdiction; and 
(10) enforce rules of the Supreme Court and Judicial Council. 
7. UTAH CODE ANN. §78A-2-202 Courts of justice - Authority. 
(1) All courts of justice have the authority necessary to exercise their 
jurisdiction 
(2) If a procedure for an action is not established, a process may be 
adopted that conforms with the apparent intent of the statute or rule of 
procedure. 
8. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-7-202 Justice court judges to be appointed-
Procedure—Retention. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Local government executive" meams: 
(i) for a county: 
(A) the chair of the county commission in a county 
operating under the county commission or expanded 
county commission form of county government; 
(B) the county executive in a county operating under 
the county executive-council form of county 
government; and (C) the county manager in a county 
operating under the council-manager form of county 
government; and 
(ii) for a city or town: 
(A) the mayor of the city or town; or 
(B) the city manager, in the council-manager form of 
government described in Subsection 10-3b-103(6). 
(b) "Local legislative body" means: 
(i) for a county, the county commission or county council; 
and 
(ii) for a city or town, the council of the city or town. 
(2) There is created in each county a county justice court nominating 
commission to review applicants and make recommendations to the 
appointing authority for a justice court position. The commission shall be 
convened when a new justice court judge position is created or when a 
vacancy in an existing court occurs for a justice court located within the 
county. 
(a) Membership of the justice court nominating commission shall be 
as follows: 
(i) one member appointed by: 
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(A) the county commission if the county has a county 
commission form of government; or 
(B) the county executive if the county has an 
executive-council form of government; 
(ii) one member appointed by the municipalities in the 
counties as follows: 
(A) if the county has only one municipality, 
appointment shall be made by the governing authority 
of that municipality; or 
(B) if the county has more than one municipality, 
appointment shall be made by a municipal selection 
committee composed of the mayors of each 
municipality in the county; 
(iii) one member appointed by the county bar association; and 
(iv) two members appointed by the governing authority of the 
jurisdiction where the judicial office is located. 
(b) If there is no county bar association, the member in Subsection 
(2)(a)(iii) shall be appointed by the regional bar association. If no 
regional bar association exists, the state bar association shall make 
the appointment. 
(c) Members appointed under Subsections (2)(a)(i) and (ii) may not 
be an elected official of the county or municipality. 
(d) The nominating commission shall submit at least two names to 
the appointing authority of the jurisdiction expected to be served by 
the judge. The local government executive shall appoint a judge 
from the list submitted and the appointment ratified by the local 
legislative body. 
(e) The state court administrator shall provide staff to the 
commission. The Judicial Council shall establish rules and 
procedures for the conduct of the commission. 
(4) Selection of candidates shall be based on compliance with the 
requirements for office and competence to serve as a judge. 
(5) Once selected, the Judicial Council shall certify the judge as qualified to 
hold office upon successful completion of the orientation program. 
(6) The selection of a person to fill the office of justice court judge is 
effective upon certification of the judge by the Judicial Council. A justice 
court judge may not perform judicial duties until certified by the Judicial 
Council. 
(7) Upon the expiration of a justice court judge's term of office, the judge 
shall be subject to an unopposed retention election in the county or counties 
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in which the court to which the judge is appointed is located, in accordance 
with the procedures set forth in Section 20A-12-201. 
(8) Before each retention election, each justice court judge shall be 
evaluated in accordance with the performance evaluation program 
established in Subsection 78A-2-104(5). 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-7-208. Temporary justice court judge. 
If a justice court judge is absent or disqualified, the appointing authority 
may appoint another justice court judge currently holding office within the 
judicial district to serve as a temporary justice court judge. A retired justice 
court judge may also be appointed as a temporary justice court judge under 
rule of the Supreme Court. 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, RULE 65B. 
EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF. 
(a) Availability of Remedy. Where no other plain, speedy and adequate 
remedy is available, a person may petition the court for extraordinary relief 
on any of the grounds set forth in paragraph (b) (involving wrongful 
restraint on personal liberty), paragraph (c) (involving the wrongful use of 
public or corporate authority) or paragraph (d) (involving the wrongful use 
of judicial authority, the failure to exercise such authority, and actions by 
the Board of Pardons and Parole). There shall be no special form of writ. 
Except for instances governed by Rule 65C, the procedures in this rule shall 
govern proceedings on all petitions for extraordinary relief. To the extent 
that this rule does not provide special procedures, proceedings on petitions 
for extraordinary relief shall be governed by the procedures set forth 
elsewhere in these rules. 
(d) Wrongful Use of Judicial Authority or Failure to Comply With Duty; 
Actions by Board of Pardons and Parole. 
(1) Who May Petition. A person aggrieved or whose interests are 
threatened by any of the acts enumerated in this paragraph may 
petition the court for relief. 
(2) Grounds for Relief. Appropriate relief may be granted: (A) where 
an inferior court, administrative agency, or officer exercising judicial 
functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion; (B) 
where an inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or person 
has failed to perform an act required by law as a duty of office, trust 
or station; (C) where an inferior court, administrative agency, 
corporation or person has refused the petitioner the use or enjoyment 
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of a right or office to which the petitioner is entitled; or (D) where 
the Board of Pardons and Parole has exceeded its jurisdiction or 
failed to perform an act required by constitutional or statutory law. 
(3) Proceedings on the Petition. On the filing of a petition, the court 
may require that notice be given to adverse parties before issuing a 
hearing order, or may issue a hearing order requiring the adverse 
party to appear at the hearing on the merits. The court may direct the 
inferior court, administrative agency, officer, corporation or other 
person named as respondent to deliver to the court a transcript or 
other record of the proceedings. The court may also grant temporary 
relief in accordance with the terms of Rule 65 A. 
(4) Scope of Review. Where the challenged proceedings are judicial 
in nature, the court's review shall not extend further than to 
determine whether the respondent has regularly pursued its 
authority. 
11. UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, RULE 29. DISABILITY 
AND DISQUALIFICATION OF A JUDGE OR CHANGE OF VENUE. 
(a) If, by reason of death, sickness, or other disability, the judge before 
whom a trial has begun is unable to continue with the trial, any other judge 
of that court or any judge assigned by the presiding officer of the Judicial 
Council, upon certifying that the judge is familiar with the record of the 
trial, may, unless otherwise disqualified, proceed with and finish the trial, 
but if the assigned judge is satisfied that neither he nor another substitute 
judge can proceed with the trial, the judge may, in his discretion, grant a 
new trial. 
(b) If, by reason of death, sickness, or other disability, the judge before 
whom a defendant has been tried is unable to perform the duties required of 
the court after a verdict of guilty, any other judge of that court or any judge 
assigned by the presiding officer of the Judicial Council may perform those 
duties. 
(c)(1)(A) A party to any action or the party's attorney may file a motion to 
disqualify a judge. The motion shall be accompanied by a certificate that 
the motion is filed in good faith and shall be supported by an affidavit 
stating facts sufficient to show bias or prejudice, or conflict of interest. 
(c)(1)(B) The motion shall be filed after commencement of the action, but 
not later than 20 days after the last of the following: 
(c)(l)(B)(i) assignment of the action or hearing to the judge; 
(c)(l)(B)(ii) appearance of the party or the party's attorney; or 
(c)(l)(B)(iii) the date on which the moving party learns or with the exercise 
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of reasonable diligence should have learned of the grounds upon which the 
motion is based. If the last event occurs fewer than 20 days prior to a 
hearing, the motion shall be filed as soon as practicable. 
(c)(1)(C) Signing the motion or affidavit constitutes a certificate under Rule 
11, the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and subjects the party or attorney to 
the procedures and sanctions of Rule 11. No party may file more than one 
motion to disqualify in an action. 
(c)(2) The judge against whom the motion and affidavit are directed shall, 
without further hearing, enter an order granting the motion or certifying the 
motion and affidavit to a reviewing judge. The judge shall take no further 
action in the case until the motion is decided. If the judge grants the motion, 
the order shall direct the presiding judge of the court or, if the court has no 
presiding judge, the presiding officer of the Judicial Council to assign 
another judge to the action or hearing. Assignment injustice court cases 
shall be in accordance with Utah Code Ann. §78-5-138.1 The presiding 
judge of the court, any judge of the district, any judge of a court of like 
jurisdiction, or the presiding officer of the Judicial Council may serve as 
the reviewing judge. 
(c)(3)(A) If the reviewing judge finds that the motion and affidavit are 
timely filed, filed in good faith and legally sufficient, the reviewing judge 
shall assign another judge to the action or hearing or request the presiding 
judge or the presiding officer of the Judicial Council to do so. Assignment 
injustice court cases shall be in accordance with Utah Code Ann. §78-5-
138. 
(c)(3)(B) In deterniining issues of fact or of laiw, the reviewing judge may 
consider any part of the record of the action and may request of the judge 
who is the subject of the motion and affidavit an affidavit responsive to 
questions posed by the reviewing judge. 
(c)(3)(C) The reviewing judge may deny a motion not filed in a timely 
manner. 
(d)(1) If the prosecution or a defendant in a criminal action believes that a 
fair and impartial trial cannot be had in the jurisdiction where the action is 
pending, either may, by motion, supported by an affidavit setting forth 
facts, ask to have the trial of the case transferred to another jurisdiction. 
(d)(2) If the court is satisfied that the representations made in the affidavit 
are true and justify transfer of the case, the court shall enter an order for the 
removal of the case to the court of another jurisdiction free from the 
objection and all records pertaining to the case shall be transferred 
1 Despite UCA §78-5-138's inclusion in Rule 29 of URCrP, this statute has been 
replaced by UCA §78A-7-208. 
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forthwith to the court in the other county. If the court is not satisfied that 
the representations so made justify transfer of the case, the court shall either 
enter an order denying the transfer or order a formal hearing in court to 
resolve the matter and receive further evidence with respect to the alleged 
prejudice. 
(e) When a change of judge or place of trial is ordered all documents of 
record concerning the case shall be transferred without delay to the judge 
who shall hear the case. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES OF THE CASE 
The Appellee submits the following alternative statement of the issues of the case 
and standard of review: 
1. Did the trial court err as a matter of law in dismissing the petition for 
extraordinary relief when finding Judge David Marx was legally appointed as a 
justice court judge in Box Elder County? (Applt. App. at 14-17, 18-19). 
Alternative Standard of Review. "While the decision to grant or deny 
extraordinary relief is within the district court's discretion," the legal reasoning of 
the court is reviewed for correctness." Hogs R. Us v. Town of Fairfield, 2009 UT 
21at^[6. 
2. Did the trial court err as a matter of law in dismissing the petition for 
extraordinary relief when finding that Judge David Marx had authority and did not 
exceed his jurisdiction while acting as a temporary justice court judge in Box 
Elder County? (Applt. App. at 14-17,18-19). 
Alternative Standard of Review: "While the decision to grant or deny 
extraordinary relief is within the district court's discretion," the legal reasoning of 
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the court is reviewed for correctness." Hogs R. Us v. Town of Fairfield, 2009 UT 
21atTf6. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The petition for extraordinary relief arises out of the Petitioner's request to nullify 
Judge Marx's appointment as temporary judge in Petitioner's criminal misdemeanor case. 
(Applt. App. at 3-13). The Petitioner was cited on or about July 14, 2008 by Animal 
Control Officer Vickie Chidester for excessive dogs or cats on property, domestic fowl 
running at large, and Nuisance. (Add. at 5). Petitioner appeared, pled not guilty to the 
charges, and submitted an appearance of counsel. (Applt. App. at 3-13). Petitioner 
likewise submitted a motion to recuse Box Elder Justice Court Judge Kevin Christensen. 
Id. Judge Christensen granted the Petitioner's recusal motion. (Applt. App. at 14-17). 
Judge Marx was assigned the case by the Box Elder Justice Court, based upon his 
standing as a temporary judge holding office within the judicial district. Id. 
Petitioner then submitted his petition for extraordinary relief on or about 
December 1, 2009. (Applt. App. at 1-13). 
On December 8, 2008, the chair of the Box Elder County Commission appointed 
First District Justice Court Judge David Marx and Commission subsequently ratified the 
appointment of Judge Marx as a temporary judge for the Box Elder Justice Court. (Applt. 
App. at 14-17,22-35). 
On or about June 15, 2009, the District Court dismissed Petitioner's petition for 
extraordinary relief. (Applt. App. at 14-17). 
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The underlying criminal misdemeanor case has not been scheduled for trial in the 
justice court, at the request of the Petitioner, pending the outcome of this appeal. (Add. at 
6). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Under Rule 65B of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, extraordinary relief may be 
available "[w]here no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available." 
"Appropriate relief may be granted where an inferior court, administrative agency, or 
officer exercising judicial functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion." 
URCP Rule 65B(d)(2). The District Court was correct in dismissing the petition for 
extraordinary relief because Judge Marx was properly appointed as a temporary judge in 
Box Elder County. Utah state law provides that an appointing authority may appoint a 
temporary judge to handle conflict cases when the justice court judge is disqualified or 
absent. UCA §78A-7-208. The appointing authority is the local government executive, 
which for a county may be chair of the county commission, county executive, or county 
manager, depending upon the form of county government, or for a city or town, is the 
mayor. The Box Elder County Commission appointed Judge Marx as a temporary judge 
to assist with conflict cases for the Box Elder Justice Court. The County's appointment 
grants Judge Marx the proper authority and jurisdiction to reside over Petitioner's 
pending misdemeanor case and other cases he may be assigned as a result of the absence 
or conflict. 
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The District Court dismissal of the petition for extraordinary relief is further 
correct because Judge David Marx did not exceed his jurisdiction or abuse his discretion. 
Prior to his assignment of Petitioner's misdemeanor case and appointment, Judge Marx 
was a First District justice court judge. As a justice court judge in the First District 
Judiciary, Judge Marx met the qualification requirements to be deemed a temporary 
judge under Utah law, previously certified by the Judicial council and recommended by 
the county attorney. 
In light of the County's appointment of Judge Marx, the petition for extraordinary 
relief should be denied because Petitioner lacks standing and the nature of the relief 
sought is moot. No palpable or distinct injury is found in the record as a result of the 
County's appointment of Judge Marx, nor is there sufficient public interest warranting 
the nullification of Judge Marx's alleged prior rulings not found in the record. Further, 
the Judge Marx subsequent appointment cures any alleged defect found at the time 
Petitioner acquiesced to his appointment as a substitute judge, making the requested relief 
moot. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The District Court was Correct in Dismissing the Petition for 
Extraordinary Relief Because Box Elder County Commission Properly 
Appointed Judge David Marx as a Temporary Justice Court Judge. 
Pursuant to Rule 65B(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, "where no other 
plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available, a person may petition the court for 
extraordinary relief on any of the grounds" identified in the rule. Rule 65B(d) addresses 
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the wrongful use of judicial authority and the failure to comply with judicial duty. 
Specifically, Rule 65B(d) states: 
Appropriate relief may be granted (A) where an inferior court... exceeded 
its jurisdiction or abused its discretion; (B) where an inferior court... has 
failed to perform an act required by law as a duty of office, trust, or station; 
(C) where the an inferior court... has refused the petitioner the use or 
enjoyment of a right or office to which the petitioner is entitled.... 
Courts reviewing claims of the wrongful use of judicial authority are directed to "look to 
the nature of the relief sought, the circumstances alleged in the petition, and the purpose 
of the type of writ sought in deciding whether to grant extraordinary relief.9' State v. 
Barrett, 2005 UT 88, ^ [11 (citing Renn v. Utah State Board of Pardons, 904 P.2d 677, 
683 (Utah 1995)). 
"Rule 65B(d) extraordinary relief is available upon a showing that the lower court 
abused its discretion. Barrett, 2005 UT at [^26. "A court faced with a petition for 
extraordinary relief will consider multiple factors when determining whether or not to 
grant the relief requested in the petition." Id. at f24. The court's exercise of its5 
discretion "when deciding whether to grant or withhold relief is akin to the court's 
exercise of its certiorari review powers." Id. Among the 'special and important reasons' 
for consideration is whether "a panel of the court of appeals 'has rendered a decision that 
has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings ... as to 
call for an exercise of the Supreme Court's power of supervision.'" Id. (quoting Rule 
46(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure). 
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The alleged abuse of discretion asserted by Petitioner pertains to the appointment 
requirements of a temporary justice court judge. The appointment of temporary justice 
court judge is governed by statute. Utah law provides: 
If a justice court judge is absent or disqualified, the appointing authority may 
appoint another justice court judge currently holding office within the judicial 
district to serve as a temporary justice court judge. A retired justice court judge 
may also be appointed as a temporary justice court judge under rule of the 
Supreme Court. 
UCA §78A-7-208. The "appointing authority" is the local executive, which means; for a 
county, the chair of the county commission, the county executive, or the county manager, 
depending upon the form of the county form of government, or for a city or two, the 
mayor. UCA §78A-7-202(l)(a), (2)(d). The local legislative body is to ratify the 
appointment. UCA §78A-7-202(2)(d). The local legislative body for a county is the 
county commission or county council, or for a city or town, the city or town council. 
UCA §78A-7-202 (l)(b). 
Here, the chair of the Box Elder County Commission appointed First District 
Justice Court Judge David Marx on December 8, 2008, and the Commission ratified the 
appointment the same day. (Applt. App. 22-35). Brigham City's case against Petitioner 
was pending prior to Judge Marx's appointment and remains pending today. (Add. at 5, 
6). Therefore, Box Elder County Commission's appointment of Judge David Marx meets 
the requirements necessary to appoint a temporary justice court judge for the County and 
Judge Marx may serve as a temporary justice court judge over the case. 
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While Petitioner's asserts additional requirements are necessary to complete the 
appointment process for temporary judges, Petitioner confuses the requirements for a 
temporary judge with newly appointed judicial officer not holding judicial office. 
Petitioner claims that Judge Marx's appointment must be voided because the local 
legislative body failed to submit his appointment to the Judicial Council and the Judicial 
Council failed to certify his qualifications to hold office. Petitioner's assertion that a 
certificate from the Judicial Council is necessary prior to a temporary justice court judge 
may exercise jurisdiction is not based upon the governing statute, UCA §78A-7-208. 
(Applt. Bf. at 10-11). Moreover, the additional requirements are unnecessary. Appointed 
temporary judges already hold judicial office or have retired in good standing within the 
judicial district. It is inferred, based on Judge Marx's standing as a current judge in the 
judicial district that he may exercise judicial authority upon appointment, absent 
presentment to the Judicial Council, because he already core judicial functions and 
qualifies to perform judicial opinions on disqualification motions for the County under 
Rule 29 of Utah Rules of Criminal procedures. To require a county to confirm the 
qualifications of a judicial officer within the same judicial district, already deemed in 
good standing with the Judicial Council, serves no legitimate legislative purpose. 
Petitioner further argues that Judge Marx's appointment should be voided because 
the appointment was not accompanied by a written opinion from the county attorney. 
Such a requirement is also unnecessary and serves no legitimate legislative purpose. The 
requirements necessary to hold a judicial office are the same in Cache County as they are 
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in Box Elder County. Judge David Marx was previously appointed as a First District 
Judicial Officer and has performed functions within the district. Judge Marx was 
appointed following the presentation and explanation of the Box Elder County Attorney. 
(Applt. App. 22-35). To require a county attorney to submit a written decision to the 
Judicial Council for them to review the qualifications of a judicial officer already holding 
office within the judicial district prior to his/her appointment as a temporary judge is 
overly burdensome and unnecessary. 
Petitioner next contends that the appointment of Judge Marx by the County fails 
because the Box Elder County Commission failed to include the duration of the 
temporary appointment. UCA §78A-7-208; UCA §20A-12-201. A temporary judge is 
appointed only in the limited context of the absence, or disqualification of the assigned 
judge. UCA §78A-7-208. The intent of the statute is to grant extended authority and 
subject matter jurisdiction for experienced judicial officers for the limited purpose of 
assisting with conflict cases. The ability to appoint a retired judge as a temporary judge 
negates the Petitioner's argument that retention election constitutes a limitation for the 
duration for the temporary judicial officers. 
In this case, Judge Marx was assigned Petitioner's misdemeanor case at the 
request of Petitioner. (Appl. App. at 14-17). Petitioner filed the motion to recuse Judge 
Christensen and Judge Marx was subsequently appointed. (Appl. App. at 14-17). The 
County's appointment temporary appointment is therefore complete and whether 
Petitioner's misdemeanor case takes three to five years to reach a trial or sentence, the 
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appointment of Judge Marx should remain so long has he is maintains his office as a 
justice court judge within the judicial district, remains in good standing with the Judicial 
Council, and Box Elder County Commission approves of the appointment.2 
In conclusion, the appointment of a Judge Marx as temporary justice court judge 
was completed on December 8, 2008, when the chair of the County Commission, 
appointed Judge Marx and the appointment was ratified the Commission by a majority 
vote. It is unnecessary to require counties5 to submit the qualification of a judge 
currently holding judicial office within the judicial district to the Judicial Council, or to 
require the county attorney to submit an opinion as to the qualifications of said judicial 
officer appointed as a temporary judge. It is further not required by statute to withhold an 
appointment until the Judicial Council submits a separate certificate for each municipality 
or county in the district that appoints a temporary judge for conflict purposes. With the 
appointment completed on December 8, 2008, Judge Marx's assignment as a conflict 
judge, in accordance with Rule 29 of Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and Utah law 
should remain. 
2 Presumably, Judge Marx may retain his appointment as a temporary judge on 
Petitioner's case if he retires within the judicial district. However, if Judge Marx 
transfers or assumes another justice court judgeship outside of the judicial district, Judge 
Marx no longer qualifies as for the temporary judgeship appointment under UCA §78A-
7-208. 
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II. The District Court Was Correct in Dismissing the Petition for Extraordinary 
Relief Because Judge David Marx was Qualified and Acted Within his 
Jurisdiction and Authority when Assigned Petitioner's Pending Misdemeanor 
Case. 
Justice courts in Utah are created by statute and hold the authority necessary to 
exercise their jurisdiction and may adopt procedures to confirm with the apparent intent 
of the statute or rule of procedure. UTAH CONST., art. VIII, § 1; UCA §78A-1-101; UCA 
§78A-2-202. Indeed, Article VIII, Section 1, vests judicial power in courts, not in judges. 
A justice court's authority includes the authority to "compel obedience to its judgments, 
orders, and process, and to the orders of a judge out of court...." UCA §78A-2-201. A 
court's authority begins with the premise "[sjubject matter jurisdiction is the authority 
and competency of the court to decide the case." Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 
852-53 (Utah 1994). A justice court, maintaining subject matter jurisdiction, likewise 
maintains authority to proceed in disqualification motions smd receive orders of a judge 
transferred the case. 
Judges exercising the justice court's jurisdiction must likewise have authority and 
qualifications to reside over a case. Id; UCA §78A-7-104. The selection of judges to a 
justice court is governed by statute. UTAH CONST., art. VII], § 11. As outlined above, 
Utah law provides that a temporary judge is qualified to perform core judicial functions 
injustice courts, so long as they are a justice court judge within the judicial district, or a 
retired judge appointed by the appointing authority. Legislative authority, however, 
"does not extend to a legislative body the discretion to determine who has the authority to 
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exercise that jurisdiction." Ohms, 881 P.2d at 853. Thus, the local legislative body 
appointment process should not be extended to create discretion to appoint a temporary 
judge for each individual misdemeanor case wherein the judge is deemed absent or 
disqualified. 
Justice courts are likewise provided authority to adopt procedures in harmony with 
the apparent intent of the statute or rule of procedure, including the authority to transfer 
cases and arrange for substitute judges. UCA §78A-2-202. The procedure to transfer a 
justice court case is outlined by Rule 29 of Utah's Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 29 
of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that the assignment of justice court case 
be in accordance with Utah's law governing the appointment of temporary justice court 
judges. URCrP Rule 29(c)(2). 
Here, the assignment of the Petitioner's misdemeanor case was made after 
Petitioner moved to recuse Judge Christensen. (Applt. App. 14-17). Judge Christensen 
granted the motion and the case was assigned Judge Marx. Id. At the time of the 
assignment, Judge Marx was a qualified First District justice court judge serving in Hyde 
Park and North Logan, Utah. Id. Shortly after the recusal motion was granted, Box Elder 
County was notified by the Administrative Office of the Court that Judge Marx required 
the appointment by the applicable appointing authority. (Applt. App. 22-35). On 
December 8, 2008, the appointment of Judge Marx was completed. 
Notwithstanding the appointment by the County Commission and pursuit of a 
Rule 29 disqualification motion by Petitioner, Petitioner contends that Judge Christensen 
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unlawfully delegating away his judicial power by appointing a non-judicial officer, 
similar to Holm v. Smilowitz, 840 P.2d 147 (Utah App 1992). (Applt. Br. 18-22). The 
ruling in Holm's is distinguishable from this case because the appointment of a 
commissioner is dissimilar to the justice court's attempts to grant a Rule 29 recusal 
motion by transferring the case to a qualified judicial officer within the judicial district. 
Judges holding office within the judicial district are qualified to hear and determine 
controversies between adverse parties and questions presented in litigation. Moreover, 
Rule 29 envisions the reliance of judges within the judicial district. There is no evidence 
that Judge Christensen knowingly transferred a case to a non-judicial officer or attempted 
to purposefully avoid the appointment process by transferring Petitioner's case to non-
judicial officer exempt from accountability. Rather, Judge Christensen assigned 
Petitioner's case to a qualified judicial officer, with experience to address issues in 
Petitioner's misdemeanor case. 
Judge Christensen further agreed with the Box Elder County Attorney that the 
appointment process was required by the Box Elder County Commission to complete the 
assignment of conflict cases when he became aware of the incomplete appointment of 
Judge Marx. (Applt. App. 22-35). Upon receiving notice of the need to appoint Judge 
Marx as a temporary justice court judge in Box Elder County, Judge Marx was properly 
appointed. Given his appointment, Judge Marx holds authority to exercise the 
assignment of Petitioner's pending misdemeanor case, including the authority to address 
any pending pre-trial motions asserted by Petitioner. 
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The ratification of the assignment of Petitioner's misdemeanor case by the 
appointing authority is permissible. Petitioner's unpublished case, Kasteler v. Gibbons, 
2007 UT App 267 (unpublished) supports the premise that the appointment by a 
substitute judge, by the proper appointing authority, nullifies a petition challenging the 
transfer of a case to a properly appointed, qualified judge. (Add. 7-8). The facts in 
Kasteler state that the entire case was first transferred to a neighboring jurisdiction (the 
Holladay Justice Court) and a substitute judge (Judge Daniel Gibbons), rather than 
keeping the case within the jurisdiction. Id. Finding that the initial petition for 
extraordinary directed the appointing authority to appoint a substitute judge (Judge 
Virginia Ward), in accordance with UCA §78-5-138 (renumbered as UCA 78A-7-208), 
the Kasteler Court denied additional challenges to the appointment of the temporary 
judge. Id. Similar to the direction in Kasteler, the Box Elder County Attorney secured 
the appointment of a temporary judge in Petitioner's case in the jurisdiction maintaining 
authority. Following the appointment of Judge Marx, Petitioner's requested relief has 
been granted and no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy remains outstanding. The 
Court should therefore deny the petition for extraordinary relief. 
Petitioner makes numerous claims that Judge Marx made "rulings, orders, 
judgments, assessed fines, assessed penalties, jail time, or other legal activities prior to 
his appointment, in abuse of his jurisdiction and the Court's discretion, which are not 
included in the record. (Applt. Br. 16-27). Absent a record, Petitioner fails to provide any 
specific facts to support his claims. 
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Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(7), of the Utah Rules Appellate Procedure, "[a]ll 
statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be supported by citations 
to the record...." Rule 24(a)(9) also indicates that "[t]he argument shall contain the 
contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including 
the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court...." "The combined 
effect of these rules is to require that parties on appeal make well-reasoned legal 
arguments supported by specific facts of record." West Jordan City v. Goodman, 2006 
UT 27 at T[32. Absent any specific record of the rulings, orders, judgments, fines, 
penalties, jail time or other legal activities prior to his appointment, the Petitioner fails to 
present any credible record which enable a response because multiple municipalities use 
the Box Elder Justice Court, including Brigham City and Perry City. On the record 
submitted, Petitioner notes there is no fine, penalty, jail time or adverse judgment entered 
against Petitioner. Due to Petitioner's failure to marshal the evidence, Petitioner's claims 
should be denied. 
Notwithstanding the failure to submit a record of any rulings, orders, and 
judgments by Judge Marx prior to Box Elder County Commission's appointment, any 
such rulings, orders and judgments should be upheld based upon Judge Marx de facto 
authority. A judge de facto is defined as: 
One who holds and exercises the office of a judge under color of lawful 
authority and by a title valid on its face, though he has not full right to the 
office, as where he was appointed under an unconstitutional statute, or by 
an usurper of the appointing power, or has not taken the oath of office. 
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Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d at 853-54 (citing Black's Law Dictionary 841 (6th ed. 
1990)). Utah case law has defined an officer de factor as follows: 
An officer de facto is one whose acts, though not those of a lawful officer, 
the law, upon principles of policy and justice, will hold valid so far as they 
involve the interest of the public and third person, where the duties of the 
office were exercised, 
First without a known appointment or election, but under such 
circumstances of reputation or acquiescence as were calculated to induce 
people, without inquire, to submit to or invoke his action, supposing him to 
be the officer he assumed to be, 
Second, under color of a known and valid appointment or election, but 
where the officer had failed to conform to some precedent requirement or 
condition, as to take an oath, give a bond, or the like. 
Third, under color of a known election or appointment, void because the 
officer was not eligible because there was a want of power in the electing or 
appointing body, or by reason of some defect or irregularity in its exercise, 
such ineligibility, want of power or defect being unknown to the public. 
Fourth under color of an election or appointment by or pursuant to a public 
unconstitutional law, before the same is adjudged to be such. 
Olms, 881 P.2d at 854 (citing Vance v. Fordham, p.2d 124,131 n5). Decisions by judges 
de facto are binding. In In re Thompson's Estate, 72 Utah 17, 18 (1927), the court held 
that a district court judge had, at least, de facto authority to sit with the supreme court, 
given (1) the district judge had authority in other instances to site with the court, and (2) 
the parties had knowledge of and did not object to the district judge's participation. 
Judge Marx held de facto authority because he was transferred Petitioner's case 
pursuant to Rule 29 while he held a judicial office within the judicial district. The 
assignment of the Petitioner's case, in accordance with Rule 29, constitutes a 
25 
circumstance of reputation or acquiescence calculated to induce the parties, without any 
inquiry, to submit to his position as a judicial officer. Acting under the color of authority 
granted him through Rule 29, Judge Marx's held de facto authority to hold pre-trial 
conferences and address any matters presented by the parties prior to the Petitioner's 
pending trial. 
In sum, the District Court was correct in finding Judge Marx was qualified to be 
assigned Petitioner's case and that he acted within his jurisdiction and authority. Judge 
Marx was assigned Petitioner's misdemeanor case following Petitioner's Rule 29 recusal 
motion. Judge Marx met the qualification to be assigned Petitioner's case. Following his 
subsequent appointment, Judge Marx may proceed with Petitioner's pending 
misdemeanor case. There are no rulings, orders, or judgments presented in the record. 
Notwithstanding the Petitioner's reference to facts not in the record, Judge Marx alleged 
rulings prior to his appointment were cloaked with his de facto judicial authority because 
the rulings stem from assignments following a transfer of a conflict case in accordance 
with apparent intent of Rule 29 of Utah's Rules of Criminal Procedure and acquiesced by 
the Petitioner. 
III. The Petitioner Lacks Standing and the Petition for Extraordinary Relief is 
Moot, in light of the Box Elder County Commission's Appointment of Judge 
David Marx. 
Pursuant to Utah case law, "[a] petitioner for extraordinary relief must have 
standing, just as any other litigant must have." Hogs R US, 2009 UT at ^|7. Petitioner 
lacks standing because "no distinct and palpable injury" gives him a personal stake in the 
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outcome of the legal dispute pertaining to Judge Marx's alleged rulings prior to his 
appointment. Id. at | 8 . There are two means to establish standing; the tradition test and 
the alternative test. Id. at [^8 (citing Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality 
Bd.9 2006 UT 74,1J18). Under the traditional test, a party has standing if, (1) the party 
asserts that it has or will be adversely affected by the challenged actions, (2) a causal 
relationship between the injury to the party and the challenged actions and the relief 
asserted is alleged, and (3) the relief requested is substantially likely to redress the injury 
claimed. Id. Here, the Petitioner neither alleges an injury nor presents any injury in the 
record. Therefore, the Petitioner does not have any injury requiring the Court to grant his 
request relief; which is the nullification of all judicial rulings, orders, and decisions of 
Judge Marx prior to the appointment by the county commission. Moreover, there is no 
showing that the relief requested will redress the injury claimed because there the alleged 
rulings, orders and decisions do not pertain to the Petitioner. Petitioner thus lacks 
standing under the traditional test. 
Utah case law allows an alternative showing of standing if an appropriate party 
asserts issues of sufficient public importance to balance the absence of the traditional 
standing criteria. Id. at 9 (citing Sierra Club, 2006 UT 74, [^41). Petitioner's claim lacks 
sufficient public importance because it does not raise a public issue that is unlikely to be 
raised if the party is denied standing. Judge Marx was a qualified, justice court judge in 
the district at the time of his assignment as a temporary judge for the Box Elder Justice 
Court. Moreover, there are no records of any rulings, motions, or decisions warranting a 
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sufficient public issue. In light of his prior position, Petitioner fails to allege a sufficient 
public issue important enough to receive standing to challenge all alleged decisions of 
Judge Marx prior to his appointment. 
Petitioner's extraordinary relief is also moot. Where the requested judicial relief 
in a Rule 65B petition can no longer affect the rights of the litigants, the case is moot and 
a court will normally refrain from adjudicating it on the merits. Spain v. Steward, 639 
P.2d 166 (Utah 1981). Petitioner does not assert any claim that the justice court "failed to 
perform an act required by law" or "refused the petitioner the use or enjoyment of a right 
or office" under Rule 65B(d). Instead, Petitioner's extraordinary relief claims rests upon 
the Rule 65B(d)(l), under the assertion the justice court exceeded its jurisdiction or 
abused its discretion. 
Petitioner's request relief is moot because the Box Elder County Commission's 
adherence to UCA §78A-2-208 granted Judge Marx jurisdiction and discretion as a 
temporary justice court judge. Utah law upholds mootness claims in extraordinary relief 
petitions unless there is a wide concern, which affects the public interest. Anderson v. 
Taylor, 2006 UT 79, t l^-l 1. There is no record to suggest that Petitioner's requested 
relief affects a wide concern or public interest. There is no likelihood of any 
reoccurrence of the hypothetical challenges to Judge Marx's appointment by similar 
situated defendants and no legal reasoning set forth challenging any ruling or order in the 
underlying criminal case by Judge Marx. Moreover, the Court should find the 
Petitioner's request relief to nullify the assignment of Judge Marx to Petitioner's 
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misdemeanor case moot because the subsequent appointment cured all alleged defects 
presented in the record indefinitely. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court was correct in dismissing the Petition for Extraordinary Relief. 
Judge Marx was appointed by the chair of the Box Elder County Commission and ratified 
by the majority of the commission on December 8, 2008 after Petitioner's motion to 
recuse Judge Christensen was granted. Petitioner's criminal misdemeanor case remains 
pending and Judge Marx's appointment as temporary judge is valid absent a presentment 
to the Judicial Council because, at the time of the appointment, he held office as a justice 
court judge within the judicial district 
The District Court dismissal of the Petition for Extraordinary Relief is further 
correct because Judge David Marx did not exceed his jurisdiction or abuse his discretion. 
Judge Marx was assigned Petitioner's case following Petitioner's motion for recusal and 
Judge Marx exercised his experience as a current justice court judge to hold pre-trial 
conferences at the request of the parties' prior to his appointment by the County 
commission. Cloaked, at a minimum with de facto judicial authority, Judge Marx did not 
abuse or exceed his jurisdiction because Petitioner acquiesced to Judge Marx as a 
temporary justice court judge and Box Elder County Justice Court maintained at all time 
subject matter jurisdiction. 
Finally, Petitioner lacks standing to seek to nullify alleged judicial decisions of 
Judge Marx not found in the ruling because no palpable or distinct injury is found in the 
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record and the challenge to the appointment fails to constitute a sufficient public interest 
warranting the nullification of alleged prior rulings. Additionally, Judge Marx 
subsequent appointment cures any alleged defect found at the time Petitioner acquiesced 
to his appointment as a temporary judge, making the requested relief moot. 
For the forgoing reasons, the District Court's ruling should be upheld. 
DATED this ^M», day of May, 2010. 
By: 
BOtf ELDER COUN* ATTORNEY 
<~>azS-DATED this 2f , day of May 2010. 
By: 
BRIGHAM CITY ATTORNEY 
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CHARLES A. SCHULTZ 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
222 W 700 S 
BRIGHAM CITY UT 84302 
RE: Pett v. Brigham City Corp Appellate Case No. 20090620 
Dear Mr. SCHULTZ: 
Please be advised that the notice of appeal in this case has been 
filed with the Utah Supreme Court. The case number is 20090620 
and should be indicated on future filings and correspondence. 
Included with this notice is an order transferring the case to 
the Utah Court of Appeals within twenty days. The order remains 
in effect, unless, within 10 calendar days of the date of the 
order letters are received advising the Supreme Court why they 
should retain the case. 
Effective July 1, 2009, the transcript request may be ordered on 
line by going to the court's web site www.utcourts.gov and 
selecting "Of Interest to the Public Community" and "Request a 
Transcript". 
If you have a question regarding a transcript you may contact: 
Nicole Gray, (801) 238-7975, nicoleg@email.utcourts.gov 
Ashlee MacEwen, (801) 578-3947, ashleemgemail.utcourts.gov 
Lisa Collins, (801) 578-3907, lisaac@email.utcourts.gov 
This court will permit documents of 10 pages (including 
attachments) or less that do not require a filing fee to be filed 
by fax. The faxed document, which must bear a facsimile of the 
required signature, will be accepted as an "original1' document 
until the true original and any required copies are received by 
the court. The original must be received bv this court within 5 
AHHpnrliim nc.01 
business days from the^date of the transmission by fax. If the 
original is not received1 within that period, the court will .treat 
the filing as void. A faxed filing is considered "received"" when 
stamped by the clerk's office. The time for stamping is limited 
to regular office hours (weekdays 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.). All 
risks associated with filing by fax are borne by the sender. The 
fax number for this court is 578-3999. 
The Docketing Statement and attachments, consisting of the 
original and two copies, is due within twenty-one (21) days of 
the filing of the notice of appeal in the trial court. Therefore, 
the docketing statement is due August 18, 2009. 
Please note, failure to perfect an appeal at any time during the 
appeal process may result in dismissal of the appeal. 
Susan Willis 
Judicial Services Manager 
cc: MICHAEL E CHRISTIANSEN 
STEPHEN R HADFIELD 
FIRST DISTRICT, BRIGHAM CITY, 080101282 
Addendum pg.02 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH FILED 
LiTA^ APPELLATE COURTJ 
00O00 L- 5- *''' 
JUL 3 1 2009 
Robert Pett, 
Petitioner and Appellant, 
v. Case No. 20090620-SC 
Brigham City Corporation; 
Box Elder County Corporation; 
and David Marx, 
Respondents and Appellees. 
ORDER 
Pursuant to rule 42(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and 
effective twenty days from the date of this order, this matter will be 
transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition. Thereafter, 
all further pleadings and correspondence should be directed to that 
Court. Prior to the effective date of the transfer, this Court is 
willing to consider retaining this matter on its own docket. 
Accordingly, any party to the appeal may submit a letter to the Court 
regarding the appropriateness of retention. The letter shall contain 
the following four categories of information, preceded by a heading 
describing each category: 
1. The name of the case and the appellate case number 
2. The names of all parties involved in the case and the 
attorneys and firms representing the parties. 
3. A concise statement of the issues presented on appeal 
4. A brief explanation of the reasons supporting retention or 
transfer. 
The letter shall not exceed five pages and must be received within ten 
calendar days of the date of this order. In the event the tenth day 
falls on a weekend or holiday, the letter must be received by the 
first business day thereafter. Following transfer to the Court of 
Appeals, the parties may not move for recall of the transfer. 
Qj*» &, &Q09 
FOR THE 
Pat H. Bartholomew 
Clerk of Court 
AHHpnHnm nrr AQ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on July _jH__, 2009, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States 
mail or placed in Interdepartmental mailing to be delivered to: 
MICHAEL E CHRISTIANSEN 
MANN HADFIELD & THORNE 
98 N MAIN 
PO BOX 876 
BRIGHAM CITY UT 84302-0876 
CHARLES A SCHULTZ 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
222 W 700 S 
BRIGHAM CITY UT 84 302 
STEPHEN R HADFIELD 
BOX ELDER COUNTY ATTORNEY 
9 W FOREST ST STE 310 
BRIGHAM CITY UT 84 302 
FIRST DISTRICT, BRIGHAM CITY 
ATTN: SHAUNA / HOLLIE 
PO BOX 873 
4 3 N MAIN 
BRIGHAM CITY UT 84302-0873 
Susan W i l l i s 
J u d i c i a l S e r v i c e s Manager 
Case No. 20090620-SC 
FIRST DISTRICT, BRIGHAM CITY, 080101282 
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ROBERT JENSEN FETT, 
Defendant 
RULING ON MOTION 
Case No 081002646 
Judge David Marx 
ORDER 
The motion and request for decision pertaining to the above referenced case has been 
reviewed by the court The case was stricken from the court's calendar on February 11, 
2010 
The decision of the court is to order the jury trial postponed at the Defendant's request, 
and continue the case without date 
/cZ~ 
I/I 
Judge David Marx- Date / / 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I [ ] hand-delivered [X] mailed via first class I 
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the Ruling on Motion to Postpone Jury 
Michael E Christiansen 
Bngham City Prosecuting Attorney 
Mann, Hadfield & Thome 
98 North Main 
P O Box 876 
"Rncrham Citv. UT 8430^ AAA^A*™ 
D Rand Henderson 
P O Box 594 
Logan, UT 84323-0594 
nff06 
Not Reported in P.3d, 2007 WL 2206912 (Utah App.), 2007 UT App 267 
Judges and Attorneys 
UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT RULES BEFORE CITING. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Todd KASTELER, Petitioner and Appellant, 
v. 
Honorable Daniel B GIBBONS, Robert D. Gray, Honorable Virginia Ward, Casey Fttts, Bill Anderson, 
Marilyn Brusch, Rea Goddard, Mike Rutter, Shane Siwik, and John Weaver, Respondents and 
Appellees. 
No. 20070345-CA. 
Aug. 2, 2007. 
Third District, Salt Lake Department, 070900875; The Honorable Tyrone E Medley. 
Todd Kasteler, Salt Lake City, Appellant Pro Se. 
Janice L Frost, Salt Lake City, for Appellees. 
H Craig Hall and Jennifer A. Brown, Salt Lake City, for Appellee Daniel B. Gibbons. 
Before Judges BENCH, DAVIS, and McHUGH. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official Publication) 
PER CURIAM: 
* i Appellant Todd Kasteler appeals an order dismissing his second emergency petition for 
extraordinary relief. This case is before the court on a sua sponte motion for summary disposition. 
Kasteler was charged with driving on a suspended license in South Salt Lake. Because some 
witnesses were court employees, South Salt Lake Justice Court Judge Catherine M. Johnson recused 
herself after Kasteler filed a motion to disqualify. Judge Johnson transferred Kasteler's cases to the 
Holladay Justice Court and purported to appoint Judge Daniel Gibbons of the latter court as the 
substitute judge. Judge Denise Lindberg's ruling on Kasteler's original emergency petition for 
extraordinary relief vacated the appointment and directed the South Salt Lake Mayor to appoint a 
substitute judge to hear the cases, specifically citing Utah Code section 78-5-138. See Utah Code 
Ann S 78-5-138 (2002V The mayor appointed Salt Lake City Justice Court Judge Virginia Ward to sit 
as a temporary judge for the South Salt Lake Justice Court. 
Kasteler filed a second emergency petition for extraordinary relief, which was assigned to Judge 
Tyrone Medley. Kasteler claimed that: (1) Judge Daniel Gibbons was required to dismiss the case for 
lack of jurisdiction; (2) the South Salt Lake Mayor was required to comply with Utah Code section 78-
5-134f2) in appointing a temporary justice court judge; and (3) Judge Virginia Ward exceeded her 
jurisdiction in setting an arraignment because there had been no review of his motion to disqualify 
Judge Johnson by a reviewing judge under rule 29 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Judge 
Medley dismissed the second emergency petition, ruling that it was moot "in substantial part" and 
that Kasteler failed to demonstrate that he had no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy through 
either an appeal of Judge Lindberg's ruling or proceedings to enforce that ruling. This appeal is limited 
to a review of Judge Medley's ruling. 
Judge Medley did not err in ruling that the second emergency petition was moot in substantial part 
because the issues were resolved in Judge Lindberg's ruling on the original petition. The assertion 
that it is necessary for Judge Gibbons to dismiss Kasteler's cases is without merit because the cases 
remain pending in the South Salt Lake Justice Court where they originated. Similarly, Kasteler's oft 
repeated assertion that appointment of a temporary, substitute justice court judge must comply with 
the same procedures as for appointment of a permanent judge is without merit. Utah Code section 
78-5-138 was referenced in Judge Lindberg's ruling as the procedure for appointment of a substitute 
judge under the circumstances. That statute states: 
I f a justice court judge is absent or disqualified, the appointing authority may appoint another 
justice court judge currently holding office within the judicial district to serve as a temporary justice 
court judge. A retired justice court judge may also be appointed as a temporary justice court judge 
under rule of the Supreme Court. 
* 2 Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-138. The statute governs the temporary appointment of a justice court 
judge when the assigned judge has been disqualified, which is precisely what occurred in this case 
upon Judge Johnson's recusal. We note that Kasteler did not appeal any part of Judge Lindberg's 
ruling. 
Kasteler's assertion that there must be further review of his motion to disqualify Judge Johnson is 
frivolous. Judge Johnson did not dispute the motion to disqualify and instead chose to recuse. No 
further review is required by rule 29 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure because the motion was 
effectively granted. 
Judge Medley did not err in dismissing the second emergency petition for extraordinary relief. 
Judge Lindberg's ruling on the original emergency petition granted the relief requested and addressed 
Kasteler's legitimate procedural concerns. The underlying cases remain pending in South Salt Lake, 
and the mayor appointed Judge Ward as a substitute judge in accordance with section 78-5-138. If 
Judge Ward has since elected not to participate, as suggested in the responses, the South Salt Lake 
Mayor should appoint another substitute judge in accordance with section 78-5-138. Accordingly, we 
affirm. 
Utah App.,2007. 
Kasteler v. Gibbons 
Not Reported in P.3d, 2007 WL 2206912 (Utah App.), 2007 UT App 267 
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